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DEMOCRATIZING TRANSITION IN TAIWAN 
Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan 
At 6:05 on the evening of September 28, 1986, Taiwan 
opposition leader Fei Hsi-p'ing stood up in a meeting room of Taipei's 
Grand Hotel and announced, "The Democratic Progressive Party is estab-
lished!" 
Capping a series of remarkable moves by both the ruling Kuomintang 
(KMT) and the non-party opposition (tang-wai, hereafter TW), this an-
nouncement and its aftermath marked a potentially epochal step in Tai-
wan's political evolution. It also broke precedent in the worldwide 
evolution of Leninist-style political systems, none of which has ever before 
tolerated the formation of a significant opposition party. The bold changes 
in Taiwan drew attention on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, where 
political reform was also a focus of attention, and raised questions for U.S. 
foreign policy. Taiwan's party system reform warrants a careful examina-
tion of the participants' motives, the reform process, the potential impact 
within Taiwan and outside, and the reforms' theoretical significance. 
1950-1986: Liberalization of a Leninist 
Party-State 
The Kuomintang was shaped by its founder, Sun Yat-sen, under Comin-
tem tutelage in the 1920s as a Leninist-style party. The basic party struc-
ture established then endures today: selective membership recruitment; a 
revolutionary and nationalist ideology; a centralized decision-making 
structure under a Central Committee; a policy-making Central Standing 
Committee and a policy-implementing secretariat with organization, intel-
ligence, and propaganda departments; control of the army through a polit-
ical cadre system; maintenance of a youth league; leadership over the 
policies and personnel of the state apparatus; and-until recently-intoler-
(2) 
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ance for the existence of any opposition party. (Like the CCP with the 
"democratic parties," the KMT has long co-existed with two other small 
parties that do not constitute a serious opposition.) 
From the beginning, the Leninist structure stood in tension with non-
Leninist strains in the party's tradition-a fact which made the KMT dif-
ferent from other Leninist parties. Under its ideology, Sun Yat-sen's 
Three Principles of the People, the KMT did not define its role in terms of 
the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes. Instead, it justi-
fied itself as a moral and technocratic vanguard capable of guiding national 
construction and gradually introducing full constitutional democracy. (In 
this way, the KMT ideology of "revolutionary democracy" resembled the 
ideologies of other Leninist party-states in their post-mobilization phases, 
such as the Soviet "state of the whole people" and "Chinese-style social-
ism.") After its break with the CCP in 1927 the KMT adopted an ideol-
ogy of anticommunism, with procapitalist domestic policies and a pro-
West foreign policy, and all of this further opened it to the influence of 
non-Leninist ideas. Upon establishing its rule on Taiwan the party justi-
fied its restriction of political and other rights-including the right to or-
ganize new political parties-not as necessities of the revolutionary state 
but as temporary measures arising from the condition of civil war between 
the KMT and CCP regimes. These restrictions were thus not embodied in 
the basic constitutional order but in "Temporary Provisions Effective Dur-
ing the Period of Communist Rebellion" and, under the authority of these 
provisions, in a limited regime of martial law (chieh-yen). 1 
Even before 1949, in keeping with Sun's ideas of tutelary democracy, the 
KMT tried to make nominal progress away from party dictatorship to-
ward constitutional democracy, for example by promulgating a new con-
stitution in 1947 (the same constitution in effect in Taiwan today, although 
it is modified by the Temporary Provisions just mentioned.) Starting in 
1950 in Taiwan, gradual steps were taken to implement local self-rule at 
the provincial and lower levels, while maintaining the national government 
structure brought over from the mainland. In that year the Taiwan Pro-
vincial Assembly was established, its members indirectly elected by munic-
ipal- and county-level legislators for two-year terms. In 1954 for the first 
time the provincial assemblymen were directly elected, for three-year 
terms eventually changed to four. In 1969 elections were held for Taiwan 
I. Shih-pao chou-k'an (hereafter SPCK), No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), pp. 8-13. This is 
the New York edition of the popular Taiwan newsweekly, Shih-pao hsin-wen chou-k(m. Also 
see Hungdah Chiu and Jyh-pin Fa, "Law and Justice Since 1966," in James C. Hsiung et. a!., 
eds., Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience. 1950-1980 (New York: The 
American Association for Chinese Studies, 198 I), pp. 314-330. 
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delegates to the central government's Legislative Yuan and National As-
sembly, and indirectly for the Control Yuan. As is well known, however, 
the majority of seats in these organs continued to be held by mainland 
delegates who had been elected in 1947 (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 Membership of Elected Central Government Organs 
National Legislative Control 
Assembly Yuan Yuan 
Number of members 
under constitution 3,136 882 257 
Number elected 
on the mainland 2,841 760 180 
Number who came 
to Taiwan 1,576 470 104 
Of those still serving 899 222 35 
Supplementary seats 
elected in Taiwan 91 74 24 
Overseas Chinese 
members selected by 
the President 0 27 10 
Total number of 
delegates now serving 990 323 69 
Average age of those 
now serving 74 71 70 
Percent aged 
69 or below 23.6% 31.4% 38.5% 
Percent aged 70-79 47.1% 34.7% 27.1% 
Percent aged 
80 or above 29% 33.8% 34.2% 
Average deaths per 
year, 1981-86 43.6 14.1 
SOURCE: Shih-pao chou-k'an, No. 85 (October 11-17, 1986), p. 31. 
Local elections brought a number ofnon-KMT politicians into the polit-
ical arena, but it was not until the rise of the TW in the late 1970s that the 
KMT faced a strong, quasi-organized opposition. The one possible excep-
tion to this statement was the abortive formation of a China Democratic 
Party (Chung-kuo min-chu tang) by Lei Chen and several other politicans 
in 1960. But the regime's rapid and severe response to this attempt 
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showed that its Leninist instincts remained strong, and the COP dissolved 
with Lei Chen's arrest. 
By the 1970s economic growth had brought major changes to Taiwan 
society. Average annual per capita income had increased from US$50 in 
1941 to US$3, 175 in 1985.2 The average annual rate of economic growth 
was 11% from 1964 to 1973 and 7.7% from 1974 to 1984.3 Despite in-
creasingly severe export competition from mainland China (in terms of 
labor costs) and South Korea (in terms of high-technology goods), Tai-
wan's 1985 exports totalled almost $34 billion, with the United States tak-
ing 48% of the total and Japan 11%.4 The egalitarian policies pursued 
under the principle of "People's Livelihood" had prevented extreme polar-
ization of wealth: the total income of the richest fifth of the population 
was only 4.4 times that of the poorest fifth. s The middle class now consti-
tutes an estimated 3(}-50% of the total population. Over 46% of the pop-
ulation has attended at least junior middle school. 6 
While economic and social change created a more sophisticated public, 
the diplomatic and foreign-trade situations provided salient political issues. 
Taiwan's diplomatic isolation has steadily increased since its expulsion 
from the United Nations in 1971, de-recognition by Japan in 1972, and the 
breaking of formal diplomatic relations by the United States in 1979. Ex-
cept for the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, Taiwan's economy is 
the most trade-dependent in the world. In a recent China Times poll of 
leaders in twelve industries, the respondents said that the weakest points of 
the Taiwan economy were the overconcentration of export markets, the 
lack of diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, and exces-
sive import dependency on a few suppliers. 7 In other opinion polls the 
public gives the government highest marks for its economic policies and 
lowest marks for its diplomatic performance, which many view as too in-
flexible. 8 These issues have played an increasingly prominent role in elec-
toral campaigns and legislative debates. 
The emergence of the TW can be dated from the 1977 election, when 
non-party politicians won 22 seats in the provincial assembly and four 
posts as mayor or county magistrate. In the following year the term tang-
wai itself came into common use when Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh 
2. Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Develop-
ment, 1986), p. 33. 
3. Chung-kuo lun-t'an (Taipei), No. 262 (August 25, 1986), p. 39. 
4. SPCK, No. 82 (September 20-26, 1986), p. 54. 
5. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, p. 60. 
6. Chung-hua min-kuo t'ung-chi t'i-yao (Taipei: Hsing-cheng yuan, 1983), pp. 16-18. 
7. SPCK, No. 82 (September 20-26, 1986), p. 54. 
8. See, e.g., SPCK, No. 60 (April 20-26, 1986), pp. 6-7. 
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and others organized a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Corps (Tang-wai 
chu-hsuan t'uan) to coordinate the campaigns of non-KMT candidates 
throughout the island. In subsequent elections held in 1980, 1981, 1983, 
and 1985, the KMT was generally able to get about 70% of the vote and 
the TW and independent politicians about 30%. 
Until 1986, the TW was not a party but a loosely knit movement con-
sisting primarily of small personality-based factions absorbed in large part 
in local issues. What drew these factions together was dissatisfaction with 
the ruling party's position on the interlocked issues of Taiwan's future in 
the international arena and the role of the KMT in the Taiwan political 
system. Both the candidates and the electoral supporters of the TW con-
sist predominantly (although not exclusively) of Taiwanese, not surprising 
since 85% of the island's population is conventionally counted as 
Taiwanese, and since under Taiwan's electoral system by far the majority 
of the offices open for electoral competition are at the provincial level and 
below. Although both the KMT and the state apparatus have been heavily 
Taiwanized, the KMT remains mainlander-dominated at its highest levels, 
and it defines Taiwan's status as part of China as being settled beyond 
discussion. 
The character of the TW as a predominantly Taiwanese political force 
in a mainlander-ruled polity has naturally made the issue of Taiwan's rela-
tionship to the .mainland central to TW politics. On this issue the TW 
politicians are ranged along a radical-moderate continuum. Few 
Taiwanese favor reunification with the mainland. But the moderates are 
willing to forego for the time being any open challenge to the KMT's rule 
and to its one-China ideology, while the radicals-although they cannot 
say so openly under censorshi~appear to favor some form of Taiwan 
·independence, without KMT rule and, in some cases, under socialism {but 
not under the PRC). Some among both radical and moderate TW politi-
cians have called for transport, commercial, postal, and other contacts 
with mainland China. They do so, however, not in order to promote 
reunification but because they believe that the KMT response to the main-
land's diplomacy has been too rigid, and that such contacts are necessary 
in order to begin the search for a new relationship with the mainland and a 
less isolated position in the world. Other TW issues include opposition to 
the exclusive use of Mandarin on Taiwan television and to the promulga-
tion of KMT ideology through the schools. 
The radicals emerged as a strong force in the 1977 "Chung-li Incident," 
a violent demonstration against alleged election tampering in Chung-li 
city. They showed still greater strength in 1979, when they mobilized a 
series of demonstrations which culminated on December lO in a violent 
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clash between demonstrators and police that became known as the "Kao-
hsiung Incident." In response, the government arrested and tried Shih 
Ming-teh, Huang Hsin-chieh, and more than 60 others of whom eight re-
ceived severe sentences, and closed the offices of Mei-/i-tao (Formosa) 
magazine, which was the organization behind the demonstrations. 
Beginning in 1984, TW politicians produced a series of magazines which 
directed strong attacks at government policies and leaders on a wide range 
of policy and personal issues. The government banned and closed many 
magazines, but the TW evaded control by reopening the publications 
under new names and by publishing magazines in the disguised form of 
monthly or weekly book series. In 1985, two apparently government-
backed libel suits were filed against TW magazines. Although the plain-
tiffs were successful in both cases, from the government's point of view the 
broader results were less satisfactory. The verdicts were controversial; the 
defendants argued that their freedom of speech and, in one case, legislative 
immunity, had been abridged; the defendants' supporters staged demon-
strations, including a series of send oft's for defendant Lin Cheng-chieh as 
he prepared to serve his year-and-a-half prison term. 9 It became apparent 
that conviction in a libel case could be turned into political capital. 
Moderates continue to dominate among opposition politicians on the 
island (the radicals' main base is overseas), but the exigencies of Taiwanese 
politics have imparted an increasingly militant flavor to the moderates' 
tactics. Despite the successes of KMT rule and the amelioration of main-
lander-Taiwanese social relations, some Taiwanese voters have deep-seated 
feelings of having been colonized, and they respond emotionally to the 
martyr symbolism around such jailed leaders as the Kaohsiung Eight. In 
this political culture mass rallies, emotional rhetoric, and confrontational 
demonstrations are tools of electoral survival for policy moderates. Even 
while adopting such tactics to some degree, moderates like K'ang Ning-
hsiang suffer constant criticism for being too soft on the KMT. The frac-
tious Taiwanese political style alarms many mainlanders, outside as well as 
inside the ruling party, who are used to more courtly, controlled maneu-
vering. It seems especially to alarm those in the security bureaucracy. 
Ample room existed in the mid-1980s for a tragic misunderstanding be-
tween the two political cultures, which might have led to a vicious circle of 
confrontation and repression. 
9. SPCK, No. 81 (September 14-20, 1986), pp. 40-41. 
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From Liberalization to Democratizing 
Reform 
In contrast to South Korea under the generals and Marcos' Philippines, 
where challenges to the regime were met fairly consistently with repression 
leading to further polarization, the response of the KMT to the growth 
and increasing militance of the opposition was, until late 1985, a mix of 
selective repression with institutional liberalization. The regime tried to 
repress the radical wing of the TW while stepping up recruitment of 
Taiwanese into the KMT, army, and government, including some in high 
posts, and gradually liberalizing electoral institutions and the media-
what Edwin A. Winckler calls a movement toward "soft authoritarian-
ism." 10 Despite opposition from the security bureaucracy and many main-
landers, President Chiang Ching-kuo had been trying to accommodate the 
TW as it developed. As early as 1978, he directed KMT officials to meet 
with TW figures under the auspices of a prominent newspaper publisher, 
Wu San-lien. 11 But such contacts stopped after the TW's relatively poor 
performance in the 1983 elections. 
The reform undertaken in 1986 represents a fundamental change of 
course, moving toward what we would call democratizing reform. The 
formation of an opposition political party does not by itself make Taiwan a 
pluralist democracy, but it is the most important single step that could 
have been taken in that direction. If the reform goes no further than to 
legalize the new party (and others which may be formed), it will have a 
large impact on Taiwan politics and, through enhanced electoral competi-
tion, will make the ruling party more accountable to the electorate. We 
discuss other possible future developments in a section below. 
The explanation for the change of course lies in large part with Presi-
dent and party Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo, who occupies a position of 
supreme influence in the Taiwan political system similar to Deng Xiao-
ping's in the mainland. Both the initiative for the reform and the power to 
implement it over substantial intraparty opposition lay with him. The in-
ner story of his decision is not known, but the public record provides 
enough information to reveal the general concerns that motivated him. 
The long-term impetus for both liberalization and democratization came 
from three factors described earlier: the KMT's ideological commitment 
to constitutional democracy; the economic, social, and political maturation 
of the population; and the increasing electoral appeal of the TW. But to 
10. Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to 
Soft Authoritarianism?," The China Quarterly 99 (September 1984), pp. 481-499. 
II. Interview, K'ang Ning-hsiang, Taipei, January 2, 1987. 
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understand Chiang's decision to shift from one type of reform to the other, 
we need to look at the more immediate problems facing the regime in 
1986. 
The first of these was the succession problem. Chiang is 76 years old 
and suffers from diabetes. Although he has a formal successor as president 
in Vice President Lee Teng-hui, much of his power is personal rather than 
institutional, and there is no one currently in the senior ranks of govern-
ment who is likely to be able to replace him as the lynchpin of cooperation 
between party conservatives and liberals and among party, state, army, 
and security officials. In December 1985, on the 38th anniversary of the 
implementation of the ROC constitution, Chiang addressed one element of 
this problem by stating that he would not allow himself to be succeeded as 
president by any member of his family nor by a military regime. To show 
the firmness of his opposition to a dynastic succession, he posted his sec-
ond son and potential successor, Chiang Hsiao-wu, to Singapore as deputy 
commercial counselor in the Taiwan mission. In June 1986, he appointed 
civilian official Wang Tao-yuan as Minister of Defense, signaling his intent 
to diminish the role of military men in the cabinet. He also assigned his 
younger brother, Chiang Wei-kuo, to be secretary of the National Security 
Council, a move seen as providing a further guarantee for a peaceful and 
legal succession. 12 The President may have felt that difficult and contro-
versial, but necessary, reforms should be undertaken before he passed from 
the scene rather than be left for his less well-equipped successors to handle. 
Moreover, reform could contribute to a smoother transition by increasing 
the legitimacy of the regime, reducing the motivation for the population to 
become involved in political disorders, and setting in place improved 
mechanisms for long-term recruitment of new leaders at all levels. 
Additional concerns motivating the reform were a series of internal and 
foreign shocks in 1985 and 1986. The first was the revelation that the 1984 
assassination of U.S. businessman and writer Henry Liu (Liu Yi-liang, also 
known as Chiang Nan) had been carried out at the behest of the head of 
the Defense Ministry Intelligence Bureau. The second was the bankruptcy 
of Taipei's Tenth Credit Cooperative due to mismanagement by officials 
with ties to KMT politicians, an incident which led to the resignations of 
two cabinet ministers. 13 A third was a forced modification in the govern-
ment's policy of resistance to the PRC's "unification diplomacy." In May 
1986, officials of the state-owned airline were forced into face-to-face nego-
tiations with PRC airline representatives in order to arrange the return of 
12. Shih-pao hsin-wen chou-k'an, No. 6 (June 22-28, 1986), pp. 4-7. 
13. Chung-kuo lun·t'an, No. 228 (March 25, 1985), pp. 8-24, and No. 238 (August 25. 
1985), pp. 12-15. 
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a cargo plane which its pilot had flown to Guangzhou. Although much of 
the public welcomed the government's flexibility, at the same time, the 
event was perceived as weakening its "three-no" policy (no negotiations, 
no compromise, and no contacts). 
Such incidents suggested the need to revitalize the ruling party and gov-
ernment. On the international scene, in addition, political reform offered 
the possibility of enhancing the image of a regime that is especially vulner-
able to foreign opinion because of its trade dependence and diplomatic iso-
lation. Especially in the United States, where human rights issues exert a 
substantial influence on foreign policy, the maintenance of martial law has 
long been a public-relations embarrassment for Taiwan's supporters-a 
fact often brought to the President's attention by sympathetic high-level 
American visitors. 
Finally, the initiation of bold reform steps in 1986 offered the possibility 
of strengthening the KMT's appeal in the elections scheduled for Decem-
ber 6 to fill seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Chi-
ang must have known that by initiating reform in the months leading up to 
a major election he ran the risk of entangling the reform process with the 
preelection maneuvering of both sides. His decision to do so suggests that 
he thought the advantages outweighed the dangers. 
Managing Political Reform 
"The way of the reformer is hard," Samuel P. Huntington has observed. 14 
The reformer must maintain a concentrated hold on power in order to be 
able to disperse it, and must implement reform measures quickly enough 
to prevent the consolidation of conservative opposition, but not so quickly 
as to allow the pace of events to get out of control. These problems indeed 
faced Chiang Ching-kuo in 1986. 
The first challenge was to tum a personal decision for reform into a 
party program. Chiang sought the understanding of the strong group of 
senior- and middle-level party conservatives, concentrated in the ideologi-
cal, military, and security sectors, who feared that any relaxation of mar-
tial law or the ban on parties would create an opening for communist 
subversion, Taiwan independence activity, or an alliance of the two. At 
the Third Plenum of the KMT's 12th Central Committee in March 1986, 
Chiang reminded the delegates of the party's long-standing goal of imple-
menting constitutional democracy, and said that the time had come to 
14. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1968), p. 344. 
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make further progress toward this goal. 15 After the session, on April9, he 
appointed a twelve-man task force of Standing Committee members to 
suggest reform measures. This powerful temporary organ became a virtual 
politbureau above the Standing Committee, entrusted with the power to 
establish the party's reform strategy in line with Chiang's wishes. It was 
headed by former President Yen Chia-kan, a technocrat, and former Vice 
President Hsieh Tung-min, a Taiwanese politician associated with the 
KMT moderate wing, and composed of the most powerful figures in the 
party, both liberal and conservative. 
In June, the task force reported a bold, but vague, six-point reform pro-
posal: 
1. To conduct a large-scale supplementary election to the central repre-
sentative organs (the Legislative and Control Yuans and the National As-
sembly) in order to address the problem of superannuation and deaths of 
members. 
2. To put local self-government on a legal basis. (The progress made so 
far in instituting local self-government in Taiwan has been carried out 
under an administrative order rather than a law. The pertinent legislation 
has been tabled in the Legislative Yuan since 1952. The main problem has 
been that the law would provide for direct popular election of the Taiwan 
provincial governor and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. These offi-
cials are currently appointed by the central government, and the KMT has 
feared that their direct election would create strong popularly-based rivals 
to its own politicians.) 
3. To simplify the national security laws. (Under martial law, the gov-
ernment has established a complex set of security orders, some overlapping 
with the provisions of the regular legal system, and many provisions of 
which have not been used.) 
4. To provide a legal basis for formation of new civic associations. (For-
mation of new civic associations is banned under martial law. The current 
law on civic associations does not provide for the registration of new par-
ties, and the election and recall law does not provide for their participation 
in elections.) 
5. To strengthen public order. 
6. To strengthen party work. 16 
After receiving its report, President Chiang ordered the committee to work 
out more detailed proposals for the third and fourth items first. 
15. SPCK, No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), pp. 8-9. 
16. SPCK. No. 85 (October 11-16, 1986), p. 12. 
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Meanwhile, Chiang re-opened the "channel" (kou-t'ung) to the TW, 
hoping to co-opt TW leaders into sharing a stake in an orderly reform 
process. In May, he directed KMT party officials to hold talks with repre-
sentatives of the TW through the good offices of four mediators. The 
mediators were senior presidential adviser T'ao Bai-ch'uan, aged 83, a 
long-time KMT liberal and former member of the Control Yuan, and 
three National Taiwan University professors, Hu Fo, Yang Kuo-shu, and 
Li Hung-hsi-men who had already been involved in behind-the-scenes 
negotiations in 1984 between the government and the TW that averted a 
confrontation over the illegal formation of the Tang-wai Research Associa-
tion on Public Policy (TRAPP), a quasi-political partyP The KMT was 
represented by the three deputy secretaries-general of the party Central 
Policy Commission, Liang Su-jung, Hsiao T'ien-tsan, and Huang Kuang-
p'ing. Eight delegates were selected to represent the TW, including K'ang 
Ning-hsiang and You Ch'ing; one of them, the brother of imprisoned TW 
leader Huang Hsin-chieh, declined to participate. 
According to informed observers, the President's intention was to allow 
TRAPP to register legally and to organize local branches that could nomi-
nate candidates, carry out election campaigning, and serve as a political 
party in all but name. In return, he hoped to delay the formation of a full-
scale opposition party until after the election. At the first "channel" meet-
ing, held on May 10 at a Taipei restaurant, the two sides accepted three 
common principles: respect for the constitution, cooperative efforts to 
maintain political harmony, and agreement in principle by the KMT to 
allow the TW to register TRAPP under the provisions of the civic associa-
tions law. 18 But this agreement displeased some TW politicians, who ar-
gued that it put the TW in an inferior position to the KMT, which was 
itself unregistered under that law. The second scheduled channel meeting 
on May 24 broke down over this issue. 
The approach of the election had made it difficult for the TW to com-
promise. The KMT's excellent performance in the 1983 elections con-
vinced many TW leaders that they would need the best possible campaign 
organization to hold their own in the coming contest, which would be the 
last electoral opportunity until 1989. In addition, the fall of Marcos in the 
Philippines and the increasing militance of the opposition party in South 
Korea encouraged impatience with a slow pace of change. Overseas, ex-
iled politician Hsu Hsin-liang and others had already started to form a 
"Taiwan Democratic Party." Given the militant style of Taiwanese poli-
tics, many TW politicians felt that the voters would not view them as a 
17. Interview, Professor Hu Fo, Taipei, January I, 1987. 
18. SPCK, No. 64 (May 18-24, 1986), pp. 6-11. 
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serious opposition if they did not insist on their right to organize within 
the island. 19 
While continuing to insist that TRAPP and its branches were illegal, the 
government did not move against it. But Minister of Justice Shih Ch'i-
yang warned in late September, just a few days before the new party was 
founded, that the premature formation of a full-scale political party would 
be illegal and would be treated as such. 20 
Despite this warning, the TW politicians meeting at the Grand Hotel on 
September 28 decided to take the next step. The meeting had originally 
been called to finalize the list of TW candidates. (The room had been 
reserved ostensibly for a meeting of the Rotary Club.) That morning, 
however, Fei Hsi-p'ing, K'ang Ning-hsiang, and other moderates recom-
mended altering the agenda to consider establishing a preparatory commit-
tee for a new party. More militant delegates argued for establishment of 
the new party on the spot. This might be the last gathering of a large 
number of TW figures for a long time; moreover, the government was less 
likely to arrest the participants while they were official election candidates 
than at any other time. Once a new party was established, they argued, 
there would be time enough to appoint committees to draft its program 
and charter. The name of the new party was suggested by senior TW fig-
ure and Taipei representative to the Legislative Yuan, Hsieh Chang-t'ing, 
who argued that it should include neither "Taiwan" nor "China" in order 
to avoid taking a position on the issue of Taiwan's future relations with the 
mainland. After discussion, 132 of those present signed their names to the 
declaration of the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).21 
Some participants left the Grand Hotel after the historic meeting of Sep-
tember 28 convinced that they would be arrested as soon as they came 
outside. DPP leaders hastened to assure President Chiang through private 
channels that the new party respected the ROC constitution and opposed 
communism and Taiwan independence,22 but its leaders were unwilling to 
take such a conciliatory stance publicly. 
Indeed, there was strong preference among KMT conservatives to re-
spond to the formation of the DPP by arresting the participants. President 
Chiang, however, chose to declare the new party illegal and refused to 
recognize it, meanwhile speeding the pace of drafting the new civil organi-
zations law that would legalize the party retroactively. He directed the 
twelve-man task force to hold urgent meetings to draft specific recommen-
19. SPCK, No. 81 (September 14-20, 1986), pp. 38-39. 
20. Ibid. 
21. SPCK, No. 84 (October 4-10, 1986), p. 7, and interviews, Taipei, January 2, 1987. 
22. Interview, Taipei, January I, 1987. 
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dations for reform of the martial law system and political parties ban. He 
held a series of meetings in late September with top party, military, and 
intelligence officials to seek support for his views. 23 
On October 15, Chiang was able to push resolutions through the KMT 
Central Standing Committee adopting the two key reform proposals. The 
first called for the abolition of martial law and its replacement with a na-
tional security law. Under this proposal the national security law (ex-
pected to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan in early 1987) would 
generally ban the same crimes as were banned under martial law, but 
would define them more carefully, decrease the penalties, and put the cases 
of civilian defendants before civilian courts. The national security law 
would also replace martial law provisions for entry and exit control, sea-
coast and mountain-area defense, and so on. The second resolution called 
for the revision of the law on civil organizations so as to reverse the ban on 
formation of new political parties. According to press leaks in late 1986, 
the revised law, which would be submitted to the Legislative Yuan some-
what later than the new national security law, would allow the registration 
of new political parties which adopt party constitutions and platforms; 
compete legally for power through the electoral system; and support anti-
communism, the constitution, and national unity (i.e., not Taiwan inde-
pendence).24 These three conditions are likely to become a focus of con-
tention between the DPP and the government in early 1987. DPP leaders 
contend that the government has no right to insert KMT party policies 
(anti-communism and anti-Taiwan independence) into the registration re-
quirements imposed on other parties. Observers generally assume these 
differences can somehow be resolved, perhaps through further use of the 
KMT-opposition "channel." 
Meanwhile, the KMT demanded that the DPP refrain from moving be-
yond the preparatory phase of party formation. The KMT also challenged 
the DPP to make clear its political stand. President Chiang announced 
that the new party would not be tolerated if it did not accept the three 
basic principles just described. 25 On October 11 the DPP gave its first, 
somewhat ambiguous public response, stating that it stood for respect for 
the constitution and that it would not cooperate with any political force 
advocating violence. 26 
23. SPCK, No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), p. 6. 
24. E.g., Chung pao (New York) (October 31, 1986), p. 2; Pei-Mei jih-pao (New York) 
(December 17, 1986), p. I. 
25. SPCK, No. 90 (November 15-21, 1986), p. 8. 
26. Chung-kuo shih-pao (Taipei), November 7, 1986, p. 2. 
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Reform Tested: November-December 
1986 
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The period immediately preceding the December 6 election posed a major 
test for the firmness of Chiang Ching-kuo's reform decision and his mana-
gerial skill, and a test as well for the statesmanship of the DPP. The key 
question was how the long-repressed, potentially explosive issue of Tai-
wan's status would be introduced into the political dialogue. If this ques-
tion had not been raised, the reform would have been illusory; if it had 
been pressed too far or too fast, the reform might have been aborted. 
The stance of the DPP came into clearer focus on November 10 when-
despite the government's warning that such an action would be illegal-it 
held its first National Representative Congress and adopted a party char-
ter, a 34-article "Basic Program" and a 139-article "Action Program."27 
The Congress elected Chiang P'eng-chien (David P. C. Chiang) as chair-
man. Chiang, a member of the Legislative Yuan, was a defense lawyer at 
the trial of the Kaohsiung Incident defendants, and is considered a repre-
sentative of the younger and more radical wing of the DPP. His chief rival 
for the post was Fei Hsi-p'ing, a mainlander member of the Legislative 
Yuan supported by DPP moderates. On the key question of Taiwan's fu-
ture, the basic program advocated "self-determination" by ballot of "all 
residents of Taiwan." The DPP also called for rejoining the U.N., leaving 
unstated whether the application should be in the name of China or of 
Taiwan. As its party flag, the DPP adopted a white cross against a green 
background, with a silhouette of the island of Taiwan in the middle of the 
cross, symbols which bear no visible relationship to those of the KMT or 
the Republic of China. (The green reflects the party's embrace of newly 
popular ecological issues.) Although the term "independence" was thus 
avoided, the party's position appeared to contradict the KMT's insistence 
that the status of Taiwan as a part of China is already settled. 
Both the government and the DPP faced their next challenge with the 
attempted return from abroad of radical TW politician Hsu Hsin-liang. A 
Taiwanese and former KMT member, Hsu had broken with the party and 
was elected as a TW candidate to the post of T'ao-yuan county magistrate 
in 1977, at the time of the Chung-li Incident. In 1979 he was deprived of 
this position by the Control Yuan for his participation in the demonstra-
tions preceding the Kaohsiung Incident. Hsu went into exile in the United 
States, where he joined the Taiwan independence movement. In late 1984 
he was elected first deputy general secretary of the newly formed Taiwan 
Revolutionary Party based on the east coast of the United States. In vari-
27. Chung-kuo lun-t'an, No. 268 (November 25, 1986), pp. 30-33. 
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ous of his writings or in declarations he has signed, he has called for "the 
complete disappearance of [the KMT regime] from the face of the earth" 
and the waging in Taiwan of an urban guerrilla war of socialist revolu-
tion. 28 In 1981 the Taiwan government issued a warrant for Hsu's arrest 
on charges of rebellion. 
Like Kim Dae-jung and Benigno Aquino, Hsu was drawn by the pros-
pect of an election to try to reenter the political arena at home. In May 
1986, he announced his departure from the Taiwan Revolutionary Party 
and the establishment in Los Angeles of a preparatory committee for a 
Taiwan Democratic Party (T'ai-wan min-chu tang). In October, after the 
formation of the DPP, Hsu transformed his new party into an overseas 
organization of the DPP. He announced his intention to return to Taiwan 
to campaign for the DPP, and, following Kim Dae-jung's precedent, in-
vited a number of Taiwanese and Americans-including Ramsey Clark 
and Linda Gail Arrigo (an American graduate student and the wife of the 
jailed Shih Ming-teh)-to accompany him on the flight home. 
Because of Hsu's popularity with the Taiwanese electorate, his actions 
created a dilemma for both the KMT and the DPP. Although the govern-
ment had issued a warrant, it did not wish to arrest him on the eve of the 
election. Most DPP politicians also preferred not to be encumbered at this 
sensitive juncture with the problem of his arrest, but neither could they 
square their party platform with asking him to stay away. 
Hsu was eventually kept out of the country, but not without three vio-
lent incidents, one of them Taiwan's largest since the Kaohsiung Incident. 
The first occurred on November 14 when a Hsu ally, Lin Shui-ch'iian, and 
five colleagues attempted to precede him back to Taiwan. Lin was denied 
entry at the airport because he did not have a visa. Several hundred TW 
supporters, who had come to the airport to welcome Lin, clashed with 
airport police and two persons were injured. The second and major inci-
dent occurred on November 30 when, in expectation of Hsu's arrival, an 
estimated 10,000 supporters gathered at Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek Inter-
national Airport. Hsu, meanwhile, was held up at Narita Airport in Japan 
where the airlines honored a Taiwan government request to deny him per-
mission to embark for Taiwan. During a standoff of nine hours at the 
Taiwan airport, police used water cannons and tear gas on the crowd. 
Twenty-six police vehicles as well as vehicles of the China Broadcasting 
Company and the China Television Service were overturned and damaged, 
and more than a score of policemen were injured. In the third incident, on 
28. See especially his series, "Ke-rning wan-sui," in Mei-li-tao chou-k 'an (Los Angeles), 
Nos. 91-95 (May 29-July 3, 1982), and his preface to the series, "Tu-shih you-chi-tui shou-
ts'e," in Mei-li-tao chou-k'an, Nos. 105-108 (September IS-October 9, 1982). 
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December 2, Hsu managed to arrive at the Taiwan airport on a Philippine 
Airlines plane under an assumed name. He was denied entry, but several 
thousand demonstrators, some reportedly armed with staves, clashed 
again with police, leading to a number of arrests and injuries. 29 
For the KMT reformers, the strength of popular support for Hsu after 
six years' absence came as a shock, especially in view of his advocacy of a 
violent anti-KMT revolution. The events also surprised some leaders of 
the DPP. Although the party had never recognized Hsu's overseas 
branch, it felt obliged to participate in the welcoming activities because of 
Hsu's popularity and because of the DPP's friendly links with Taiwanese 
organizations in the United States. The DPP stance was that it welcomed 
Hsu's return because of humanitarian considerations and out of respect for 
human rights. But after the second violent incident, while denouncing the 
use of water cannons and tear gas by police, the DPP also criticized the 
violence of the demonstrators, called on the government to identify and 
prosecute the perpetrators, and stated that any DPP member involved 
would be punished under party discipline. The party further announced 
that it was canceling a series of planned rallies in order to avoid any possi-
ble further outbreak of violence. 30 
The December 6 elections were held only four days after Hsu Hsin-
liang's third attempt to return. The results contained several messages for 
the leaders of both parties. 31 First, to the relief of both, they went off 
peacefully. Second, although the election confirmed the dominance of the 
KMT, the DPP showing was also strong. The results must be interpreted 
in light of the structure of the Taiwan political system, which limits the 
campaign to two weeks and restricts publicity, expenditures, and access to 
the mass media, and in which there normally is considerable vote buying 
and other irregularities. 32 Despite these disadvantages, the DPP got 
18.90% of the vote in the National Assembly election, electing 11 of its 25 
candidates, and 22.17% in the Legislative Yuan election, electing 12 of its 
19 candidates. Counting independent and minor party votes, the total 
non-KMT poll was a bit above 30% of the vote. 33 
The strength of militant sentiment in the electorate was shown by the 
overwhelming victories won by some of the more radical DPP candidates. 
The largest number of votes of any candidate island-wide was won by Hsu 
29. See the series of reports in SPCK, Nos. 91-93 (November 22-December 12, 1986). 
30. SPCK, No. 93 (December 6-12, 1986), p. 19. 
31. SPCK, No. 94 (December 13-19, 1986), pp. 3-25. 
32. See an Asia Watch Report, "Elections in Taiwan, December 6, 1986: Rules of the 
Game for the 'Democratic Holiday'" (Washington, D.C.: Asia Watch, November 1986). 
33. Chung-yang jih-pao (International Edition), December 8, 1986, p. I. 
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lung-shu, wife of Chang Cbiin-hung, in prison because of his participation 
in the Kaohsiung Incident. The second heaviest vote-getter was Hung 
Ch'i-cb'ang, a former member of the radical Editors' and Writers' Associ-
ation, and the fourth largest was Hsu Hsin-liang's brother, Hsu Kuo-t'ai. 
Hsu had been at the head of the airport demonstrators both times that his 
brother attempted to return. 
However, some moderate DPP leaders also fared well. Senior TW poli-
tician K'ang Ning-hsiang, who bad suffered a surprise defeat in his run for 
the Legislative Yuan in the 1983 election, was resoundingly reelected from 
Taipei city. Other important moderate victors were Huang Huang-hsiung, 
Ch'iu Lien-hui, and You Ch'ing. 
A further indication of the strength of the opposition came in the sur-
prising victories of three DPP candidates in occupational constituencies, 
which the KMT normally closely controls (not all seats in the two directly 
elected bodies are elected by geographic constituencies; a number are re-
served for occupational groups). In the trade union constituency, DPP 
candidates defeated the heads of both the provincial and the nation!l}-level 
trade union organizations for one seat each in the Legislative Yuan and 
National Assembly. Another DPP candidate won election to the National 
Assembly from the commerce sector. 
On the other hand, the strength of the KMT showing paid tribute to 
that party's deep organizational base and to the preference of many among 
Taiwan's affiuent population for continuity and stability. Among KMT 
candidates, strong showings were made by candidates with fresh images, 
reform leanings, or athletic, show business, or academic credentials. The 
outstanding example was the victory of reformist Chao Shao-k'ang, the top 
vote-getter in Taipei city. On the other hand, in an unprecedented defeat 
for retired military men, Taipei voters rejected a former air force vice-
commander. 
Prospects 
For the DPP, the biggest question is whether ·it can stay together, given its 
essential nature as a coalition of independent factions. The party's faction-
alism is reflected in the rules it adopted at its November 10 congress. The 
DPP made itself an elite party, with new members admitted only on the 
nomination of at least three members (by early November, total member-
ship was reportedly about 1400). 34 The purpose of this rule is apparently 
to prevent both competition among factions for control of the organization 
through recruitment of new members and infiltration by the KMT. De-
34. Chung-pao (New York), November 8, 1986, p. 2. 
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spite its small size, the party has a 31-person Central Executive Commit-
tee, an It-person Central Standing Executive Committee, an 11-person 
Central Consultative Committee, and a five-person Central Standing Con-
sultative Committee, thus offering representation in policy-making organs 
to every faction. In order further to protect each faction's prerogatives, 
the national congress is to meet yearly (as against every five or six years for 
the KMT) and the party chairman is limited to one non-renewable one-
year term. There is reason to wonder whether a party constructed so care-
fully to prevent concentration of power can survive as a party. 
The question is all the more pressing given the ideological split among 
moderate and radical members. The DPP will be under intense pressure 
from the KMT and the electorate to define the meaning it gives to "self-
determination" and to define the policy and organizational relationship be-
tween itself and the Taiwan independence movement. There is a demand 
from Taiwanese organizations overseas, such as the influential, tacitly 
proindependence Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), that 
the DPP establish overseas branches. This possibility is tempting because 
of the political support such overseas branches could provide in Washing-
ton. 35 Yet overseas branches are likely to serve as points of influence for 
independence forces. The DPP may split over issues like this, or the gov-
ernment may repress the new party if it evolves a clear proindependence 
position. 
This prospect clearly worries the PRC government as well. Given the 
PRC's announced policy that Taiwan may keep its own political system 
even after reunification, the PRC is in no position to object to any political 
reform the Taiwan authorities want to carry out. In keeping with its 
United Front policy, Beijing has welcomed the formation of the new 
party.36 According to Hong Kong sources, the Chinese authorities see no 
likelihood of the DPP taking power in Taiwan in the near future. 37 How-
ever, a PRC foreign ministry spokesman has reiterated Beijing's opposition 
to Taiwan independence, pointedly adding "or self-determination."38 The 
PRC even seems to be using the existence of the new party as the basis for 
a fresh appeal to the KMT for early reunification. "The future of the 
Kuomintang," stated Peng Zhen in his speech commemorating the 120th 
anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth, "hinges on its cooperation with the 
35. SPCK, No. 95 (December 20-26, 1986), p. 28. 
36. Chung-pao (New York), November I, 1986, p. I. 
37. Chung-pao, December 20, 1986, p. I, reporting material carried in Kuang-chiao-ching 
(Hong Kong), December 16, 1986. 
38. The New York Times, December 14, 1986, p. 14. 
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Communist Party."39 For the United States as well, the prospect of avo-
cal pro-independence force in the island is also unwelcome, chiefly because 
of the disturbance it would cause in U.S.-PRC relations.40 
DPP politicians interviewed early in 1987 in Taipei state that these con-
cerns are misplaced. Self-determination, they say, means simply that the 
residents of the island should be consulted in any decision concerning its 
future, rather than having their fate determined by the KMT, PRC, and 
U.S. without their participation. They argue that it is only common sense 
to say that the island's residents face a long-term choice among three alter-
natives: maintaining the status quo, reuniting with the mainland, or be-
coming independent. By calling for self-determination the DPP is not 
advocating any of these, but only the right of the residents to decide. It 
remains to be seen whether the KMT will accept this position as falling 
within the bounds of acceptable political discussion, and whether the DPP 
itself can remain united on the position. 
Whether or not the DPP survives in its present form, the lifting of the 
ban on party organizations may well introduce still other competitors into 
the political arena. By late 1986, three potential parties were already be-
ginning to take shape under the following tentative names:41 the Demo-
cratic Unity Party (Min-chu t'ung-i tang) under former KMT Legislative 
Yuan member Lei Yii-ch'i, which would represent predominantly middle 
class non-Taiwanese and would stand for peaceful reunification with the 
mainland; the People's Livelihood Cooperation Party (Min-sheng hsieh-li 
tang) under Kaohsiung politician Su Yii-chu, a local party which would 
have a chiefly poor working-class constituency and the support of some 
retired soldiers; and the China Patriotic Party (Chung-kuo ai-kuo tang) 
under right-wing KMT journalist Chung Shu-nan, who has spoken of 
forming this new party to oppose the DPP but is unlikely to do so since he 
would then have to leave the KMT. 
At least five additional political groups or social forces can be identified 
which are not closely tied to the KMT and have not yet been included in 
the DPP. These include a group of prounification nationalists around 
Hsia-ch 'ao magazine; a group of activists concerned mainly with ecological 
issues; Christian groups, including the Presbyterians who are politically 
active, and the fundamentalist New Testament Church; a number of local 
independent politicians; and liberal academics and professionals. Under 
the new civil associations law such forces might organize parties or interest 
groups, or they may align with the DPP, or remain unorganized. 
39. Beijing Review, No. 46 (1986), p. 23. 
40. See editorial in the Washington Post, December 4, 1986. 
41. Chung-pao (New York), October 8 and 9, November II and 20, 1986, all on p. 2. 
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Conspicuous by its absence from these lists is a potential labor or wel-
fare-state party. Taiwan has never had a strong, independent labor move-
ment; instead, the KMT has always been careful to assure its own political 
dominance of labor. The success of the DPP in this election in winning 
two seats in the labor constituency will probably motivate the KMT to 
redouble its organizing efforts in the unions to shore up its control. 
The future evolution of Taiwan's political system will, of course, depend 
even more upon the post-reform adaptation of the KMT than on the oppo-
sition. Those who lightly compare Taiwan's situation to that of South Ko-
rea or the Philippines forget that the KMT, for all its problems, is a 
vigorous organization. Its strengths include a nationalistic ideology with 
considerable appeal; much fresh blood among its members, including 
many Taiwanese (an estimated 70% of party membership); and a cadre of 
skilled technocrats, strong local political machines, control over the media 
and, through the political commissar system, control over the military. 
The KMT would probably perform well in elections even without the spe-
cial advantages it enjoys under the current electoral system, and it is un-
likely to give up all of these advantages in the course of reform. Hence it is 
unlikely that the Taiwan political system will quickly evolve into a true 
two-party system. 
Rather, assuming the democratic reforms are carried forward, Taiwan is 
more likely to remain for the foreseeable future a hegemonic party system 
like that of Mexico, or possibly to evolve into a Japanese-style dominant-
party system in which the KMT controls over half the votes while a vari-
ety of smaller parties share the remainder. Also possible, if the DPP stays 
together, is the development of a "one-and-a-half-party system" with a 
dominant KMT and a permanent minority opposition part~. 
To the extent that a hegemonic, dominant-party, or party-and-a-half 
system allows freedom of political organization and advocacy, it provides 
mechanisms that strengthen political competition and hence, government 
accountability to the people. However, KMT rule is so intimately inter-
twined with all aspects of the Taiwan system that there would have to be 
other far-reaching reforms before democratization could be said to have 
gone very far. Among the obstacles to fuller democratization are, first, 
anti-democratic biases built into the constitutional structure. ·As long as 
the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly are 
reserved for mainland constituencies, there can be no realistic possibility of 
shaking KMT control of these organs. This problem has already been 
targeted for reform; it was the first point of the six presented by the 12-
man working group in June. In addition, as long as the President is indi-
rectly elected by the National Assembly, and the Taiwan governor and 
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Taipei and Kaohsiung mayors appointed by the central government, the 
Taiwan electorate cannot control the selection of the country's top offi-
cials. Other barriers are government and party control of the press, and 
banning and censorship of the opposition press; advantages to the ruling 
party, decsribed earlier, provided by the rules of the electoral system; the 
practice of imprisonment for political crimes (according to Amnesty Inter-
national, as of August 1986 there were approximately 110 "prisoners of 
conscience" in Taiwan42); interpenetration of party and government struc-
tures along classic Leninist lines, for example, the relationship between the 
Government Information Office and the party's Cultural Work Commis-
sion, or between the government's Overseas Chinese Commission and the 
party's Overseas Work Commission (similarly, party-controlled military 
intelligence organs perform functions which in non-Leninist states are the 
purview of state organs); the political commissar system iri the army, 
which gives the KMT controi over the military; and finally, the existence 
of state and party-managed enterprises. 
Although some of these problems are on the current reform agenda, 
most of them are not; completion of the current reform, however, may 
create momentum for further democratization. On the other hand, the 
possibility always exists that a coalition of party conservatives, military 
and security personnel, and economic technocrats could call a halt to the 
reform process under various scenarios: if the call for Taiwan indepen-
dence grew too strong, if there was violence, or if a succession crisis led to 
instability at the top. 
Theoretical Implications 
Taiwan's reforms are being closely watched in China, which is also in-
volved in political reform. Although we have no hard evidence of the un-
official reaction, news of Taiwan's progress has probably been among the 
factors spurring public impatience with the slow pace of political reform 
on the mainland-impatience expressed in the form of student and worker 
demonstrations in several cities. 
Whether the Taiwan reforms can serve the mainland in any way as a 
model is a more difficult question. So far, during the current wave of dis-
cussions of reform in the PRC, the question of allowing the formation of 
opposition parties has not been publicly raised (except, reportedly, in wall 
posters). But some democrats both outside and inside the CCP advocated 
a multiparty system during the 1978-1981 Democracy Movement, so it is 
42. Amnesty International, "Republic of China (Taiwan), Political Imprisonment in Tai-
wan," Amnesty document ASA 38/11/86, dated August 1986. 
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likely that such ideas still have supporters today.43 To PRC pluralists, the 
changes in Taiwan can only encourage the belief that China's cultural 
background and Leninist patterns of organization do not preclude reform 
of the party system. 
Even so, prospects for multipartyism on the mainland have to be 
counted as slight. As we noted at the outset, the KMT has been an anom-
aly among Leninist parties because it lacks a Marxist ideology and has 
been, through most of its history, pro-Western and procapitalist. The ap-
plicability of its experience to other Leninist parties is thus limited. More-
over, the mainland Chinese population is far less prosperous and educated 
than Taiwan's, and in this sense the social conditions for pluralism are less 
promising. Also in contrast to Taiwan, the mainland's succession problem 
seems, at least outwardly, to be well under control, and the PRC's interna-
tional standing is high. And unlike Taiwan, the PRC is not dependent on 
the United States economically and militarily, and hence has less concern 
with American and other foreign public opinion. In short, the PRC lead-
ers lack the various stimuli for party system reform that motivates Chiang 
Ching-kuo. While reform of the role of the single ruling party is a major 
part of the mainland reform agenda, there are many signs that the leaders 
are not considering reform of the party system itself, or even that they 
intend to allow the question to be publicly discussed. 
If the Taiwan case carries no easy lessons for the mainland, it does seem 
relevant to other cases of democratizing reform and to the growing theo-
retical study of the democratization of authoritarian regimes. In a 1984 
article, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Samuel P. Hunting-
ton suggested that the particular conjunctions of circumstances that had 
created the world's democracies were not likely to be repeated.44 But the 
large number of democratic transitions in recent years-Spain, Portugal, 
Argentina, Peru, and others-have required political scientists to develop 
new perspectives on the problem. · 
One line of thought has been that there are circumstances in which rela-
tively democratic institutions are more functional for elites than authori-
tarian ones.45 Given permissive economic, social, and international 
43. See Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 
Chapter 5. 
44. Political Science Quarterly, 99:2 (September 1984), pp. 193-218. 
45. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 
State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in 
Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285-318, and Adam 
Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo 
O'Donnell et al., eds. Transition From Authoritarianism: Comparative Perspectives (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 47-63. 
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conditions, a turn toward democracy may be an attractive option for an 
elite facing succession problems, an economic crisis, mass unrest, interna-
tional pressure, or other problems. In such conditions relatively demo-
cratic institutions offer the possibility of improving a regime's abilities to 
legitimate itself, to regulate social conflict, to recruit successors, to gain 
access to and make use of information for policy making, and so on. 
Our analysis of Chiang Ching-kuo's motives for the reform suggests he 
is in fact seeking these benefits. Indeed, democratization may be profitable 
for Taiwan in the even more concrete sense of helping to stimulate the 
confidence of foreign investors and trade partners. In contrast to the disin-
centive effects of the instability and apparent lack of political consensus in 
a society such as South Korea, one of Taiwan's main competitors for in-
vestment funds, the perceived progress in Taiwan and the perception that 
this progress adds to political stability should help to bring in investment. 
Since democratization in Taiwan is just beginning and still faces many 
problems, it is too early to say how fully the Taiwan case will confirm this 
functional theory of democratic transitions. But the theory seems to pro-
vide a useful perspective for understanding the reform decisions made by 
the end of 1986. So far, the Taiwan experience has confirmed the proposi-
tion that democratizing reform can strengthen a regime. In addition, Chi-
ang Ching-kuo's handling of the reform process provides useful lessons for 
reformers elsewhere in the skills of consensus-building and conflict man-
agement. 
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